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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ethan Ruby, a twenty-five-year-old Wall Street trader and former 
college athlete, was crossing Delancy Street in Manhattan when the driver 
of a Budget rental vehicle ran a red light.1 The Budget vehicle struck a van, 
which subsequently plowed into Ruby,2 hurling him into the windshield of 
another vehicle fifty feet away and paralyzing him from the chest down.3 In 
December 2003, a jury awarded Ruby $24.5 million in damages, holding 
Budget Rent A Car liable under New York’s strict vicarious liability law.4 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2010, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 2007, University of Florida. 
I would like to thank my parents and my fiancé Tara for their endless encouragement, love, and 
support. 
 1. Ralph Vartabedian, Who’s Liable in Rental Cars?, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at G1, 
available at 2005 WLNR 23356194. 
 2. Jim Abrams, Auto Rental Companies Shielded from Liability in Accidents, AP ALERT–
POLITICAL , Dec. 1, 2005, available at WL 12/1/05 APALERTPOLITICS 17:19:51. 
 3. Richard C. Dujardin, Alum to Moses Brown Grads: “Make the Most of It,” PROVIDENCE 
J., June 13, 2008, at C1, available at 2008 WLNR 11190956. 
 4. Press Release, The Auto Channel, New York State Court of Appeals Denies Motion by 
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The jury verdict was one of the highest ever returned in a New York state 
court; however, it is unlikely that New York or any other state will ever 
again see such a mammoth judgment against a car rental agency.5 
In August 2005, Congress passed and President Bush signed into law a 
comprehensive transportation bill titled Safe, Accountable, Flexible, 
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).6 
Included in the bill was an amendment sponsored by Representative 
Samuel Graves (R-Missouri) now known as the “Graves Amendment.” 
The amendment called for preemption and abolition of any state statute or 
common law precedent that held rental or leasing agencies vicariously 
liable for their driver’s negligence, except when the owner itself was 
negligent or engaged in criminal wrongdoing.7 Multiple Florida courts and 
federal district courts held the Graves Amendment unconstitutional, stating 
that Congress exceeded its authority granted to it by the Commerce 
Clause.8 However, in August 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit was the first federal appellate court to weigh in on the issue, 
reaffirming the Graves Amendment’s constitutionality and leaving little 
doubt that Florida’s statutory and common law had been preempted.9  
The Graves Amendment annulled nearly ninety years of Florida 
jurisprudence and revolutionized Florida’s tort law.10 It also serves as 
another poignant example of lobbyists’ influence and of Congress’ 
increasing encroachment into areas traditionally reserved for state police 
power regulations.11 More importantly, under Florida’s current statutory 
scheme, individuals may be without adequate recourse if injured by the 
                                                                                                                     
Budget Rent A Car Corporation, Upholding Highest Future Pain and Suffering Award (May 3, 
2006) [hereinafter Court Denies Motion], http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2006/05/03/0 
05552.html; see N.Y. VEH. &  TRAF. LAW § 388(1) (McKinney 2007). Included in the judgment was 
a record-setting $10 million award for Ruby’s future pain and suffering. Court Denies Motion, 
supra. After appeals for remittitur, the final amount awarded to Ruby was approximately $18 
million. Ruby v. Budget Rent A Car Corp., 2006 WL 5110571, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006). 
 5. Court Denies Motion, supra note 4. 
 6. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
(SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). 
 7. Act of Aug. 10, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-59, Title X, § 10208(a), 119 Stat. 1935 (codified 
as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106 (2006)). 
 8. See, e.g., Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (S.D. 
Fla. 2007); Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 
2007); Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, No. 4D07-2010, 2008 WL 2744335 (Fla. 4th DCA 
July 16, 2008), reh’g granted en banc, withdrawn on other grounds, Brookins v. Ford Credit 
Titling Trust, 993 So. 2d 178, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 
 9. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 10. See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 636 (Fla. 1920) (holding that automobiles 
operated on public highways are dangerous instrumentalities and that owners are vicariously liable 
for injuries caused by the negligence of a person entrusted with such instrumentality); see also infra 
Part II.A. 
 11. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.  
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driver of a rented vehicle.12  
This Note analyzes and explores the effects of the Graves Amendment 
on Florida law and suggests legislative responses. Part II examines the 
development of and rationale behind both Florida’s strict vicarious liability 
law and the Graves Amendment. In Part III, this Note focuses on the 
conflict between Florida tort law and the Graves Amendment, thoroughly 
examining the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Garcia v. Vanguard, the 
amendment’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, and the 
amendment’s possible preemption of Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2. 
Part IV recommends the Florida Legislature take action to provide 
sufficient remedy to individuals injured by drivers of rented vehicles. 
II.   HISTORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY LAW 
A.  Evolution of the Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine and 
Vicarious Liability in Florida 
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine developed as “a concept for 
fastening liability upon the keeper of a dangerous instrument or agency 
without any necessity for a showing of negligent conduct on the part of the 
defendant.”13 Historically, this doctrine has “applied to agency 
relationships involving firearms, boilers, and explosives.”14 However, 
Florida courts have extended the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to 
impose strict vicarious liability on automobile owners.15 In Southern 
Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that an 
automobile operated on public highways was a dangerous instrumentality 
because of the large number of deaths that resulted from automobile 
accidents.16 Thus, the court held that an automobile owner is vicariously 
                                                                                                                     
 12. For further discussion, see infra notes 213–35 and accompanying text. 
 13. A. Eugene Carpenter, Jr., Note, The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine: Unique 
Automobile Law in Florida, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 412, 413 (1952) (citation omitted). 
 14. Id. at 414 (citations omitted).  More recent Florida decisions have extended the dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine to apply to golf carts, Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1984), 
and forklifts, Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). George N. 
Meros, Jr. & Chanta G. Hundley, Florida’s Tort Reform Act: Keeping Faith with the Promise of 
Hoffman v. Jones, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 461, 483 (2000). 
 15. Todd LaDouceur, Comment, Tort Law: Florida’s Liability “Airbag” for Automobile 
Owners, 46 U. FLA. L. REV. 335, 336 (1994) (citing Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051, 1052 
(Fla. 1993)).  
 16. S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 633–34 (Fla. 1920). The court noted that 
automobiles had already required stringent regulation in the interest of public safety. Id. a  634. 
Automobiles were not divested of their dangerous character in actions for damages caused by the 
negligence of an automobile operator. Id. at 636. Since the dangerous instrumentality doctrine had 
already been applied to railroad and trolley cars and since automobile deaths were becoming 
increasingly prevalent at a rate that would soon surpass deaths from railroad or trolley cars, the 
court held that the doctrine should be applied to automobiles operated on public highways. Id. at 
632, 636. 
3
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liable for damages caused by a permissive user’s operation of the owner’s 
vehicle.17 Likewise, Florida courts have held car rental companies liable 
for the negligence of their lessees.18  
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine hypothesizes that “one who 
originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best 
position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to 
pay the damages caused by its negligent operation.”19 Florida is the only 
state that imposes strict vicarious liability on the owner of an automobile 
when the owner entrusts it to another.20 Hence, under the doctrine of 
vicarious liability, the negligence of the active tortfeasor is imputed upon a 
party that is otherwise free of legal fault.21 One common justification for 
this doctrine is that by holding an automobile owner vicariously liable, a 
financially responsible party will cover damages.22 Accordingly, the 
vicariously liable party bears the entire share of the costs of harm assigned 
to the tortious actor.23 This justification comports with the notion that the 
vicariously liable party is usually better equipped to absorb and distribute 
the losses caused by the active tortfeasor.24  
Furthermore, scholars hypothesize that assigning liability to an 
automobile owner may reduce the prevalence of such accidents.25 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 636; see also Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993); Fischer v. 
Alessandrini, 907 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 
 18. Sarah E. Williams, Comment, Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine, 25 STETSON 
L. REV. 177, 180–81 (1995); see also Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 
835 (Fla. 1959); Lynch v. Walker, 31 So. 2d  268, 271–72 (Fla. 1947). 
 19. Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990). 
 20. Fischer, 907 So. 2d at 570; see also FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)3 (2009). 
 21. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 468 (Fla. 
2005); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY  § 13 (2000) (“A person 
whose liability is imputed based on the tortious acts of another is liable for the entire share of 
comparative responsibility assigned to the other, regardless of whether joint and several liability or 
several liability is the governing rule for independent tortfeasors who cause an indivisible injury.”). 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY  § 13 cmt. b (2000) 
(stating that the costs of an agent’s tortious conduct should be borne by the enterprise); see also 
William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 585 (1929) 
(“Compensation for an injured party comes first, but that cannot be considered separately from the 
capacities of the parties, to whom the loss is allocated, to bear it.”). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY  § 13 cmt. b (2000). Of 
course, Florida law recognizes a right of indemnification from the active tortfeasor when one is 
vicariously liable in tort because of the active tortfeasor’s negligence. See, e.g., Houdaille Indus., 
Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 1979). 
 24. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 500–01 (5th 
ed. 1984) (“What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a 
deliberate allocation of risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees . . . are placed upon that 
enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. . . . [The employer] is better able to absorb 
them, and distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift 
them to society, to the community at large.”). 
 25. See id. at 501. 
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Arguably, the owner is in a better position to prevent accidents than the 
driver who negligently causes a car accident because the owner does not 
have to permit a careless, negligent driver to operate the vehicle. Therefore, 
“an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be 
careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to 
take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.”26 
The dangerous instrumentality and vicarious liability doctrines have 
been cornerstones of Florida tort law since 1920.27 However, the perceived 
inequities of vicarious liability schemes have been widely criticized.28 As 
far back as 1916, critics questioned the doctrine’s imposition of liability for 
damages to the “master” “‘for offences done by a man’s servant without 
his assent.’”29 Support for this “deep pockets” practice waned in the 1980s, 
culminating in the Florida Legislature’s decision to put limits on the 
financial liability of lessors and owners who lease or lend their cars to 
permitted users.30 Traditionally, a state legislature would have been the 
final authority on the issue of vicarious liability and damage caps. 
However, the Graves Amendment broke with tradition. As the Eleventh 
Circuit noted, the Graves Amendment is novel, as its sole purpose was to 




                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 636 (Fla. 1920). 
 28. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (stating that the equation of 
liability with fault produces the most equitable result). See generally Pamela Burch Fort et al., 
Florida’s Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505 (1986) 
(concluding that the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 was the culmination of the Florida 
Legislature’s decade-long attempt to remedy deficiencies and balance the competing interests of the 
borders they place on society); LaDouceur, supra note 15 (discussing how Florida’s dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine became more flexible after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz 
Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious 
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) (discussing the shortcomings of vicarious liability law and how 
modifications could enhance the efficiency of resource allocation). 
 29. T. BATY , VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916) (citation omitted). Baty concluded that the real 
reason for the imposition of vicarious liability was to obtain damages from a “deep pocket,” opining 
that “a return to simpler manners will probably bring with it a return to saner views of liability.” Id. 
 30. Susan Lorde Martin, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Graves Amendment: 
Implications for the Vicarious Liability of Car Leasing Companies, 18 U. FLA. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 
153, 157 (2007); see also Act of July 1, 1999, ch. 99-225 § 28 (Fla. 1999) (codified as amended at 
FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9) (1999)). In Hoffman v. Jones, the Florida Supreme Court stated that in tort 
law, equating liability with fault was the most equitable result. 280 So. 2d at 438. The Florida 
Supreme Court had also previously created an exemption to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine 
by holding that leasing companies were not vicariously liable for any accidents involving vehicles 
in which the company only held bare legal title, but no right of control. Kraemer v. Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1366– 7 (Fla. 1990). 
 31. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). 
5
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B.  The Graves Amendment 
State vicarious liability laws have had tremendous economic 
ramifications for car leasing and rental companies. For instance, as of 
2004, under New York’s unlimited vicarious liability law, leasing 
companies were forced to pay out more than an estimated $130 million per 
year in court judgments, allegedly leading to a 36% decrease in the number 
of vehicles leased statewide.32 “Connecticut and Rhode Island repealed 
similar vicarious liability laws in 2003,”33 leaving New York, after 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to repeal the law,34 s one of only three 
states with unlimited vicarious liability for both short-term and long-term 
lessors.35  
The Graves Amendment,36 which was inserted into a $286.4 billion,37 
834-page federal transportation bill,38 eliminated and preempted any state 
law that held lessors vicariously liable for lessees’ negligence.39 With only 
twenty minutes of discussion in the House of Representatives,40 Congress 
decided to preempt the vicarious liability laws of at least fifteen states, 
including Florida.41 The Graves Amendment, enacted as “Rented or leased 
                                                                                                                     
 32. N.Y.’s Vicarious Liability Costly for Consumers and Auto Dealers, INS. J., July 19, 2004, 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/east/2004/07/19/features/44590.htm (noting nineteen 
automakers had reportedly stopped or curtailed their leasing programs); see also Michael Cooper, 
Federal Bill Wipes out a State Law and Makes It Easier to Lease Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, 
at B1, available at West 2005 WLNR 12248539; supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
 33. N.Y.’s Vicarious Liability Costly for Consumers and Auto Dealers, supra note 32. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-154a (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-4 (2003 (repealed 2006)). 
However, the Rhode Island statute that had limited lessors’ vicarious liability was repealed after 
only three years. See Martin, supra note 30, at 158 n.29. 
 34. Martin, supra note 30, at 156 (citing S.B. 2477, 2003-2004 Gen. Assem., 226 Legis. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2003); Assem. B. 1042, 2003-2004 Gen. Assem., Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2003)). 
 35. Martin, supra note 30, at 157. Maine and Rhode Island’s state laws currently hold all 
lessors jointly and severally liable for the negligence of lessees. Id.; ee also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-
34-4(a) (2009) and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1652(1) (2009). Connecticut limits only the 
vicarious liability of long-term lessors. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-154a (2009). 
 36. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006).  
 37. Cooper, supra note 32, at B1. 
 38. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). 
 39. SAFETEA-LU, 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006). 
 40. Martin, supra note 30, at 164 (citing 151 CONG. REC. H1199-1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 
2005) (instructions by Rep. LaHood, Acting Chairman)); see also Vartabedian, supra note 1, at G1 
(stating that there were no congressional hearings and only a very brief debate on the House floor). 
Senator Santorum also made a brief statement on the floor of the Senate. See 151 CONG. REC. 
S5433-34 (daily ed. May 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. Santorum). However, three failed bills 
introduced during the 106th Congress had previously sought to directly eliminate the vicarious 
liability of long-term and short-term lessors. See Rental Fairness Act of 2000, H.R. 1954, 106th 
Cong. (2000); Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act of 1999, S. 1130, 106th Cong. (1999); Rental 
Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 1954, 106th Cong. (1999); see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-774, pt. 1, at 3-5 
(2000) (stating the purpose, summary, background and need for the legislation). 
 41. Martin, supra note 30, at 164 (citing 151 CONG. REC. H1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) 
6
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motor vehicle safety and responsibility,” provides as follows:  
(a) IN GENERAL.—An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or 
leases the vehicle to a person . . . shall not be liable under the 
law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of 
being the owner of the vehicle . . . for harm to persons or 
property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or 
possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or 
lease, if— 
(1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of 
renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the 
part of the owner . . . .42 
Thus, the plain language of this preemption clause clearly indicates that 
Congress superseded any state law that held short and long-term lessors 
vicariously liable.43 However, the statute also contains a savings clause, 
which states:  
(b) FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS.—Nothing in this 
section supersedes the law of any State or political 
subdivision thereof— 
(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance 
standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege 
of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or 
(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the 
trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for 
failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability 
insurance requirements under State law.44 
Because Congress made no official findings or reports, the stated 
purpose of the bill must be ascertained from statements made on the House 
floor.45  
                                                                                                                     
(statement of Rep. Nadler)). According to a December 2005 article by the Associated Press, 
seventeen U.S. jurisdictions had full or limited vicarious liability statutes preempted: Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Abrams, 
supra note 2, at 1. 
 42. SAFETEA-LU, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2006). 
 43. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 44. SAFETEA-LU, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) (2006). For a discussion of whether the Florida 
vicarious liability statute falls within this savings clause, see infra Part III.D. 
 45. Cf. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 
2007) (“Although several Representatives debated the bill and discussed the impact of vicarious 
liability statutes on car rental companies doing business in multiple states, no official Congressional 
findings were made.”). 
7
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Representative Graves, whose top contributor for his 2006 
congressional campaign was Enterprise Rent-A-Car, sponsored the bill.46 
He stated that the Amendment would “correct an inequity in the car and 
truck renting and leasing industry . . . . [by] restor[ing] fair competition to 
the . . . industry[,] . . . lower[ing] costs[,] and increas[ing] choices for all 
consumers.”47 Representative Graves stated that rental costs were increased 
for all consumers by states holding rental and leasing companies 
vicariously liable for their renters’ actions.48 Representative Blunt also 
argued that the “arbitrary regulation” of vicarious liability cost consumers 
more than $100 million annually, stressing the need for Congress to 
establish a “fair national standard for liability. . . .”49 Representative 
Graves stated that as a result, smaller companies were being driven out of 
business, limiting competition and consumer preference.50 
Opponents of the amendment argued that the Graves Amendment was 
“nothing more than a special interest sham”51 that would leave innocent 
victims without recourse.52 It is not uncommon for companies to rent cars 
to uninsured motorists, and notably absent from the amendment was a 
provision that would require uninsured drivers to purchase insurance from 
the car rental companies.53 One congressman suggested that lessees’ 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Sam Graves Member Profile: 2006 Profile, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php?cid=N00013323&cycle=2006 (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2010) (stating that Enterprise Rent-A-Car contributed $37,800 during the 2005–06 election 
cycle, which was $24,700 more than the second biggest contributor); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 
Sam Graves Member Profile: 2004 Profile, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php? 
cycle=2004&type=I&cid=N00013323&newMem=N (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (stating that 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car contributed $20,000 during the 2003–04 election cycle, making them the 
second biggest contributor). Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company’s principle place of business is in 
Representative Graves’ home state of Missouri. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR CO., 2008 ANNUAL 
REGISTRATION REPORT 1 (2008), available at https://www.sos.mo.gov/BusinessEntity/soskb/Filings. 
asp?86344. Representative Graves also received substantial contributions from other leasing or 
rental companies. Martin, supra note 30, at 164. For instance, during a six-month period ending in 
Sept. 30, 2005, Representative Graves received twenty-five of fifty-two campaign contributions 
from executives of car or truck leasing or rental companies for a sum of $25,300, which was 43% of 
the total receipts during that period. I at 164 n.72. 
 47. 151 CONG. REC. H1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Graves). But see infra 
note 187.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. (statement of Rep. Blunt). It is unclear from the legislative history how the $100 
million figure was determined. See generally 151 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed. May 18, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Santorum) (providing no explanation or analysis of the computation of the $100 
million figure on the floor of the Senate); 151 CONG. REC. H1199-1202 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) 
(House Debate on Graves Amendment) (providing no explanation or analysis of the computation of 
the $100 million figure on the floor of the House). 
 50. 151 CONG. REC. H1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Graves). 
 51. Id. at H1201 (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
 52. Id. at H1200 (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
 53. See id. In a tourism-heavy state like Florida, it is possible that foreign drivers, who lack 
automobile insurance, frequently rent automobiles. If a foreign motorist driving a rented vehicle 
8
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inadequate levels of insurance were the cause of the rental companies’ 
substantial actual liability.54 Hence, by imposing liability solely on active 
tortfeasors, opponents argued that the amendment protected big rental and 
leasing companies at the expense of injured motorists.55  
The Graves Amendment passed in the House by a 218 to 201 vote 
margin, primarily on party lines.56 The full version of the SAFETEA-LU 
bill passed overwhelmingly because of the billions of dollars of 
transportation projects that both parties wanted for their congressional 
districts.57 After the Graves Amendment passed in the House, a 
spokesperson for Representative Graves called it a “common-sense tort 
reform” that was a “big win for consumers” who could expect a decrease in 
automobile rental and leasing prices.58 Such a statement is striking since 
tort laws had traditionally been left to states’ police power “in all but the 
most exceptional cases.”59 This abridgment of the principles of federalism 
is also noteworthy because the Supreme Court has “long presumed that 
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”60 While 
Congress’ reasons for permitting the Graves Amendment’s preemption of 
state laws may be novel,61 federal preemption, in general, is among the 
most frequently used doctrines in constitutional law practice.62 
                                                                                                                     
strikes a pedestrian and subsequently leaves the country, the injured individual may be left without 
adequate recourse. Id. Hence, the Graves Amendment could ultimately shift the responsibility of 
support from a car rental company (and its insurers) onto taxpayers. Id.; see also infra Part IV. 
 54. See 151 CONG. REC. H1201 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. DeFazio). 
 55. Id. (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
 56. Cooper, supra note 32, at B1. Republican majorities controlled both the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the Senate when the Graves Amendment was passed in 2005. Robin Toner, A 
Loud Message for Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at A1. 
 57. Cooper, supra note 32, at B1. Among the numerous earmarks in the SAFETEA-LU was 
the now infamous Gravina Island Bridge in Alaska, which has been dubbed the “Bridge to 
Nowhere.” See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Pork by Any Other Name . . . , WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2006, 
at B01. 
 58. Michael Cooper, Congress Passes Bill Nullifying a State Law, and Making It Easier to 
Lease Cars in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at B1. But see infra note 187. 
 59. 151 CONG. REC. at H1201 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers); s e also 
Graham v. Dunkley, 827 N.Y.S.2d 513, 522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (overturned on other grounds) 
(stating that substantivetort law has traditionally been part of the common law of the states). 
 60. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 61. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 
(2001) (citing Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 
(1994)); see also New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions [hereinafter New Evidence], 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1611 (2006–2007) (noting that “the broad trend in Congress since 1960 has 
been toward massive federal preemption of state law”). Although case analysis of federal 
preemption may be instructive in determining how the Supreme Court would ultimately construe 
the Graves Amendment, this Note does not fully address the trend of congressional preemption of 
state tort laws. However, numerous scholarly works have focused on this issue. See generally 
Michael P. Allen, A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal “Tort Reform,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 
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III.   THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FLORIDA’S “FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY”  
LAWS AND THE GRAVES AMENDMENT 
A.  Long-term Lessors’ Liability under Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)1 
In 1986, the Florida Legislature partially abrogated the dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine by eliminating long-term automobile lessors’ 
vicarious liability in certain circumstances.63 Lessors of vehicles leased one 
year or more were no longer deemed the “owner” of the motor vehicle as 
long as lessees obtained acceptable insurance that met statutory insurance 
coverage minimums.64 Hence, by ensuring the lessee maintained minimum 
insurance coverage, long-term lessors could insulate themselves from 
vicarious liability. The Florida Legislature further amended this statute in 
1996 to allow either lessors or lessees to obtain adequate insurance 
coverage.65 Under the current statute, long-term lessors are exempt from 
vicarious liability if either: (1) lessees provide insurance that covers 
liability of at least $100,000 bodily injury to one person, $300,000 bodily 
injury in one occurrence, and $50,000 property damage;66 (2) lessees 
provide at least $500,000 combined coverage for bodily injury and 
property damage liability; or (3) the lessor provides at least $1,000,000 
combined coverage for bodily injury and property damage liability in its 
blanket policy.67 
The Florida Supreme Court held this legislation constitutional, 
reasoning that “[l]imiting the liability of one vicariously liable does not 
                                                                                                                     
909 (2006) (discussing the broad scope and many types of federal tort reform); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Empowering States When It Matters A Different Approach To Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 
(2004) (arguing for broader federal powers and that federalism should be reconceptualized as 
empowering government at all levels, rather than limiting power); Betsy J. Grey, Th  New 
Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 475 (2002) 
(examining recent developments in the battle between exponents of federalization and protectors of 
state interests by evaluating the competing considerations that govern the constitutionality of 
modern day tort reform); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231–32, 276 (2000) 
(arguing that the modern doctrine of obstacle preemption “has no place as a doctrine of 
constitutional law” because the Supremacy Clause only requires preemption when the federal and 
state laws explicitly conflict with one another).  
 63. Meros & Hundley, supra note 14, at 484; see also Tort Reform and Insurance Act, ch. 
86–160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695. Note, however, that the issue of whether long-term lessors were 
vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was somewhat “unsettled at the time 
of the enactment” of the statute. Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 583 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 
1991). 
 64. Act of July 1, 1986, ch. 86-229, sec. 3 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1986)). 
 65. Act of June 1, 1996, ch. 96-362, sec. 1 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1996)). 
 66. The shorthand form for this split-limit coverage is 100/300/50. This Note will use this 
shorthand notation to signify the limits of “bodily injury to one person / bodily injury in one 
occurrence / property damage”. 
 67. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)1 (2009).  
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equate to denial of access to court. . . .”68 The limitations of Florida 
Statutes § 324.021(9)(b) are not an absolute bar to recovery beyond the 
amount of the insurance policy limits; injured parties may still seek 
additional damages from the negligent driver because there is no cap on the 
negligent driver’s direct liability.69 Further, courts have construed the 
statute narrowly, calling for strict compliance with the statutory 
requirements.70 However, this elimination of long-term lessors’ vicarious 
liability was the first of multiple significant departures from Florida’s strict 
adherence to dangerous instrumentality liability for automobile owners.71 
In the interests of equity, Florida courts have increasingly deemed that 
liability should be linked with actual fault.72 
B.  Short-term Lessors’ Liability under Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 
Under Florida common law, a car rental company was vicariously liable 
for any damages resulting from the operation of its vehicle, even if 
someone other than the person to whom the vehicle was rented operated 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Meros & Hundley, supra note 14, at 484 (quoting Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 
583 So. 2d,330, 333 (Fla.1991). The court stated that there was a rational basis for the legislation 
since long-term leases were an “alternative method of financing the purchase of a motor vehicle to 
take advantage of certain tax considerations. . . .” Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 334; see also Enter. 
Leasing Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 833 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)1 did not violate the right to a trial by jury or the right to fully recover from the 
vehicle’s operator). 
 69. Lewis v. Enter. Leasing Co., 912 So. 2d 349, 351–52 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). 
 70. See Ady v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 675 So. 2d 577, 581 (Fla. 1996) (stating that the court 
would not presume an alteration of the common law beyond what was explicitly stated in the 
statute); Dearing v. GMAC, 758 So. 2d 1236, 1238-39 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a twelve-
month lease agreement that permitted a lessee to terminate the lease for any reason after six months 
was not deemed a period of one year or longer for the purposes of Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)1); Lavado v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Fin. Servs., Inc., 711 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1998) (holding that a 300/300/100 policy was insufficient because the single limit 
coverage would permit one person to exhaust the entire occurrence limit).  
 71. See Fischer v. Alessandrini, 907 So. 2d 569, 570–71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (noting that the 
real and perceived inequities of imposing strict vicarious liability on automobile owners prompted 
the legislature to limit the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as applied to long-term automobile 
lessors). In 1999, the legislature added Florida Statutes §§ (9)(b)2 and (9)(b)3 to § 324.021, further 
limiting the application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Id. at 571. 
 72. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (1973). The Florida Supreme Court has 
further weakened the viability of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by adopting the common 
law tort of negligent entrustment. See Meros & Hundley, supra note 14, at 484. In Kitchen v. K-
Mart Corp., the Florida Supreme Court stated that by negligently leasing or loaning a dangerous 
instrumentality to an individual who poses foreseeable risks, an owner or lessor could be liable for 
injuries to third parties. 697 So. 2d 1200, 1208 (Fla. 1997). Although Kitc en involved a gun dealer 
who sold a firearm to an intoxicated man, it is well established that the tort of negligent entrustment 
applies to any supplier of a dangerous instrumentality, including an automobile, if the risks are 
foreseeable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. b, illus. 2–6 (1965). 
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the vehicle at the time of the accident.73 However, consistent with the trend 
of limiting the dangerous instrumentality doctrine’s harsh effects, the 
Florida Legislature capped74 the financial liability of short-term lessors and 
owners who rented or lent their vehicles to permissive users.75 As long as 
the lessee or operator has insurance coverage of $500,000 combined for 
bodily injury and property damage, short-term lessors’ liability is limited to 
$100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence, and $50,000 for property 
damage.76 However, this statute does not apply to “an owner of motor 
vehicles that are used for commercial activity in the owner’s ordinary 
course of business, other than a rental company that rents or leases motor 
vehicles.”77 
 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 836–37 (Fla. 1959). Generally only a 
breach of custody amounting to a conversion or theft will relieve an automobile owner of dangerous 
instrumentality liability. Id. at 835–36. Florida courts recognize three additional exceptions for 
certain leased or rented automobiles. First, under the “shop” exception, an owner is exempt from 
vicarious liability if the vehicle is negligently used during its servicing, service-related testing, or 
service-related transport. Estate of Villanueva v. Youngblood, 927 So. 2d 955, 958 (Fla.2d DCA 
2006). Second, under the “naked title” exception, an individual that merely holds naked title, if able 
to demonstrate the absence of beneficial ownership of the vehicle, is not vicariously liable for the 
tortious action of another. Aurbach v. Gallina, 753 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. 2000). Finally, a lessor may 
be exempt from vicariously liability where the operator uses the vehicle “in a weapon-like manner 
with the intent to inflict physical injury. . . .” Burch v. Sun State Ford, Inc., 864 So. 2d 466, 472 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004). 
 74. But see infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 75. Meros & Hundley, supra note 14, at 484–85. As amended, Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 provides as follows:  
The lessor, under an agreement to rent or lease a motor vehicle for a period of less 
than 1 year, shall be deemed the owner of the motor vehicle for the purpose of 
determining liability for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in 
connection therewith only up to $100,000 per person and up to $300,000 per 
incident for bodily injury and up to $50,000 for property damage. If the lessee or 
the operator of the motor vehicle is uninsured or has any insurance with limits less 
than $500,000 combined property damage and bodily injury liability, the lessor 
shall be liable for up to an additional $500,000 in economic damages only arising 
out of the use of the motor vehicle. The additional specified liability of the lessor 
for economic damages shall be reduced by amounts actually recovered from the 
lessee, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the 
lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the 
liability of the lessor for its own negligence. 
FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009). 
 76. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009). Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)3 imposes similar 
limitations upon any owner who is a natural person that loans a motor vehicle to a permissive user. 
However, since the Graves Amendment does not affect this right, this Note will not address this 
subsection. 
 77. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(c)1 (2009). Nor does the statute apply to a commercial motor 
vehicle that is transporting a hazardous material at the time of the incident. FLA. STAT. 
§ 324.021(9)(c)2 (2009). 
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A Florida district court of appeal held that this statutory limitation of 
short-term lessors’ liability was constitutional because the statute did not 
violate a plaintiff’s right to: (1) access the courts, (2) a jury trial, (3) due 
process, or (4) equal protection.78 Furthermore, the court recognized that 
the Florida Legislature had a legitimate purpose, to which the statute was 
rationally related, for shifting liability from one without fault to the active 
tortfeasor.79 Critics have characterized Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 as 
“a windfall at the expense of the injured”80 while supporters championed 
the legislation as “a natural extension of the movement toward limiting, if 
not abrogating, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Florida.”81 
However, this debate over the appropriateness of the state legislation has 
become moot in light of Congress’ 2005 decision to preempt and abrogate 
Florida law.82 
C.  Garcia v. Vanguard: An Authoritative Guide 
The Graves Amendment purports to eliminate the vicarious liability of 
any owner that leases or rents a vehicle to another person.83 He ce, under 
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a), the Graves Amendment purportedly nullifies Florida 
laws that limit, but do not eliminate, long-term and short-term lessors’ 
vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.84 Florida 
appellate courts85 and federal district courts in the Eleventh Circuit86 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Sontay v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 872 So. 2d 316, 318–19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) 
(stating that the court found Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991) as 
controlling and undistinguishable). 
 79. Id. at 319. 
 80. Robert S. Peck et. al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without A Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 397, 414 (2000). 
 81. Meros & Hundley, supra note 14, at 485. 
 82. See Pub. L. No. 109–59, 119 Stat. 1935 (2005) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. 
§ 30106 (2006)). 
 83. SAFETEA-LU, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2006). 
 84. See FLA. STAT. §§ 324.021(9)(b)1, (b)2 (2009). Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1 exempts 
long-term lessors from vicarious liability if certain conditions are met. S e supra Part III.A. Thus, 
since the long-term lessor statute does not impose vicarious liability on the lessor of the car, it does 
not conflict with the Graves Amendment; rather, Florida’s dangerous instrumentality jurisprudence 
is the source of conflict with respect to long-term lessors. Technically, the Graves Amendment has 
mooted, rather than preempted, Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1. Nevertheless, the courts have not 
recognized this distinction and are imprecise when stating that Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1 
has been preempted. See Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Servs. Trust, 1 So. 3d 1200, 1205–
06 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). 
 85. In Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, he Fourth District Court of Appeal certified a 
conflict on the same point of law with Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal. No. 4D07-2010, 
2008 WL 2744335 at *5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). However, after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008), Florida’s Fourth 
District Court of Appeal granted a rehearing en banc and withdrew its former opinion, noting that 
because the lessor maintained a $1 million blanket policy of liability insurance coverage, it met the 
requirements of Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1. Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, 993 So. 
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conflicted over whether the Graves Amendment was constitutional during 
the three-year period that immediately followed its passage. Most of these 
challenges involved car rental companies and thus focused solely on short-
term lessors’ liability under Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2.87 Florida 
and Eleventh Circuit decisions have generally addressed two issues: first, 
whether Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b) qualifies as a financial 
responsibility or insurance standard under the Graves Amendment’s 
savings clause;88 and second, in passing the Graves Amendment, whether 
Congress unconstitutionally exceeded its powers granted by the Commerce 
Clause.89 
To date, the most definitive guidance on these issues came from the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in August 2008. In Garcia v. 
Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., the court held that the Graves 
Amendment preempted Florida’s vicarious liability law and that Congress’ 
promulgation was constitutional.90 The relevant facts in Garcia were 
undisputed.91 Vanguard,92 without negligence or fault, rented a vehicle to 
Gregory Davis in Orlando.93 While driving in Marion County, Florida, 
Davis allegedly caused a three-car accident that resulted in two deaths and 
another severely injured person.94 Anticipating a suit that alleged vicarious 
                                                                                                                     
2d 178, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Thus, on rehearing, the court refrained from addressing whether 
the Graves Amendment preempted Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1. See id  
 86. Compare Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1350–51 
(S.D. Fla. 2007), with Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 821, 833 (M.D. 
Fla. 2007).  
 87. Many cases have also addressed the conflict between the Graves Amendment and 
Florida’s long-term lease provision of Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Lee, No. 6:07-cv-756-Orl-22GJK, 2008 WL 1897602, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 
2008); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. TCF Equipment Fin., Inc., No. 6:06-cv-1567-Orl-19UAM, 2007 
WL 4557204, *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2007); Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Trust, 1 So. 3d 
1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (addressing long-term leases under Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)1); Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, No. 4D07-2010, 2008 WL 2744335 (Fla. 
4th DCA Jul. 16, 2008), reh’g granted en banc, withdrawn, Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, 
993 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). However, neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Florida 
Supreme Court has addressed this specific issue. The seminal case, Garcia v. Vanguard addresses 
short-term leases; hence, the bulk of this Note focuses on the conflict between the Graves 
Amendment and Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2. See 540 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 88. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) (2006). 
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 90. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1253. 
 91. Id. at 1245. 
 92. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. operates both National Car Rental and Alamo Rent A 
Car.  Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., http://www.vanguardcar.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2010). 
 93. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1245. 
 94. Id. Interestingly, the accident occurred on February 2, 2005, which was approximately six 
months before the Graves Amendment became effective. Id.; Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10208(a),119 
Stat. 1935 (2005). However, subsection (c) of the Graves Amendment stated that it applied to any 
action commenced on or after the date of enactment, even if the conduct that caused the harm 
occurred before the date of enactment. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(c) (2006). 
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liability for Davis’ negligence, Vanguard moved for a declaratory judgment 
in federal district court against the decedents’ estates and surviving 
spouses.95 The district court granted a motion for summary judgment, 
holding that the Graves Amendment validly preempted all the vicarious 
liability claims against Vanguard.96 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by addressing whether the 
Graves Amendment explicitly preempted wrongful death actions against 
the rental company.97 It noted that Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 
addressed the specific types of lawsuits at which the Graves Amendment 
took aim, whereby a car rental company was held liable for its lessee’s 
negligent acts.98 Because “a valid federal statute preempts any state law 
with which it actually conflicts,”99 the court held that unless the actions fell 
within the statute’s savings clause, the Graves Amendment preempted the 
wrongful death actions against Vanguard.100 
The savings clause of the Graves Amendment states that it will not 
supersede a state law that imposes “financial responsibility or insurance 
standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering 
and operating a motor vehicle.”101 However, the Graves Amendment does 
not define the term “financial responsibility.”102 This statutory ambiguity 
gave the Eleventh Circuit wide discretion to elucidate Congress’ intent. 
Foremost, the court construed the terms employing the canon of scitur a 
sociis, in which the court considered the meaning of the proximate terms in 
light of one another.103 The court also stated that it would seek to avoid 
surplusage by giving meaning to each word in the statute.104 Finally, the 
court stated it could resort to the Graves Amendment’s legislative history 
but would refrain from doing so if the statutory text was otherwise 
unambiguous.105 Employing the aforementioned interpretive principles, the 
court determined that Congress used the term “financial responsibility” to 
refer to “insurance-like requirements on owners or operators of motor 
vehicles,” such as a state’s permission to carry bond or self-insurance in 
lieu of liability insurance.106 Thus, the court reasoned that the Graves 
Amendment’s savings clause contemplated situations in which states 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1245. 
 96. Id.; see also Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 821, 837 (M.D. 
Fla. 2007). 
 97. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1245. 
 98. Id. at 1246. 
 99. Id. at 1245 (citing Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 100. Id. at 1246. 
 101. 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106(b)(1) (2006). 
 102. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1246. 
 103. Id. at 1247. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
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required “either liability insurance or a functionally equivalent financial 
arrangement.”107 Florida’s vicarious liability regime was not, however, 
considered a financial responsibility regulation.108  
The court held that neither Florida common law nor § 324.021(9)(b) 
qualified as a financial responsibility law that would avoid the Graves 
Amendment’s preemption.109 It reasoned that if § 324.021(9)(b) fell within 
the Graves Amendment’s savings clause, the statutory terms of 49 U.S.C. 
§ 30106(a) would be superfluous110 and the exception would swallow the 
rule.111 Because § 324.021(9)(b)2 merely induces but does not require car 
rental companies to ensure that lessees have the requisite amount of 
insurance coverage, the court held that § 324.021(9)(b)2 did not qualify as 
a “financial responsibility law” under the Graves Amendment.112 
Although the Garcia court only explicitly addressed the viability of the 
short-term lessee statute, the preemption analysis should be nearly identical 
when applied to the long-term lessee statute.113 When concluding its 
preemption analysis, the Garcia court spoke broadly: “neither the common 
law imposition of vicarious liability on rental car companies, nor the 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 1249. 
 109. Id. The court reached this decision despite the fact that Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b) 
falls within the chapter entitled “Financial Responsibility” and the section entitled “Definitions; 
minimum insurance required.” The Florida Supreme Court has previously noted that the title of a 
chapter reflects legislative intent. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 959 So. 
2d 176, 182 (Fla. 2007). But see infra Part III.D. 
 110. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1248. Courts are generally hesitant to treat statutory terms as 
surplusage by interpreting a provision in a manner that would render superfluous another portion of 
that same law. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837, 837 
n.11 (1997). The appellants had argued that the Graves Amendment’s preemption clause would not 
be superfluous because it would still outlaw unlimited vicarious liability schemes while allowing for 
statutes, like Florida, that capped the amount of vicarious liability damages. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 
1248. In support of this contention, the appellants cited legislative history that indicated the Graves 
Amendment’s sponsors were concerned with unlimited vicarious liability schemes. Id.; see also 151 
CONG. REC. H1201 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher); id. at 1202 (Statement of 
Rep. Graves). However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the Graves Amendment did 
not provide textual support for a distinction between limited and unlimited vicarious liability. 
Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1248 (stating further that “concern with unlimited vicarious liability [does] not 
manifest any approval, explicit or implicit, of limited vicarious liability”). 
 111. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1248. The Court stated that if Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 fell 
within the Graves Amendment’s savings clause, it would effectively nullify the preemption clause. 
Id. “Every vicarious liability suit would be rescued because it could result in a judgment in favor of 
an accident victim, even though the judgment is premised on the very vicarious liability the 
Amendment seeks to eliminate.” Id. 
 112. Id.  
 113. The Graves Amendment purports to preempt “the law of any state” that imposes vicarious 
liability on an owner “engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles.” 
SAFETEA-LU, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2006). See Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Trust, 1 
So. 3d 1200, 1205–06 (holding that the plain language of the Graves Amendment preempts Florida 
Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)1). 
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Florida legislature’s endorsement of and limitations on such vicarious 
liability, constitutes a ‘financial responsibility’ requirement” as 
contemplated by the Graves Amendment’s savings clause.114 Since 
§324.021(9)(b)1 can be construed as imposing vicarious liability on long-
term lessors, Garcia should serve as an authoritative guide until a Florida 
court deems otherwise.115 
After determining that the Graves Amendment preempted Florida law, 
the Eleventh Circuit examined the Amendment’s constitutionality under 
the Commerce Clause.116 The Supreme Court has identified three broad 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce 
power: (1) the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and 
(3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.117 The Garcia 
court stated that the Graves Amendment clearly does not regulate the 
channels of interstate commerce,118 but it did consider whether the 
Amendment regulates the instrumentalities of commerce.119 Ultimately, the 
court rejected the first two prongs of the Commerce Clause analysis and 
examined the amendment’s constitutionality under the third prong: whether 
the elimination of vicarious liability for car rental companies substantially 
affected interstate commerce.120 
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. 
Raich,121 the Eleventh Circuit held that the aggregate effects of imposing 
vicarious liability on car rental companies had a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.122 The court stated that the Graves Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1249. Lower federal courts have also employed similar analyses when 
explicitly addressing the long-term lessor statute. S e, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 
6:07-cv-756-Orl-22GJK, 2008 WL 1897602, at *6 (stating that § 324.021(9)(b)1, like 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2, “does not mandate that the lessor purchase insurance, or maintain a certain level 
of coverage, and it does not penalize the lessor for failure to comply with Florida’s ordinary 
financial responsibility requirements”). 
 115. But see supra note 84. 
 116. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1249. The Commerce Clause states that “[t]he Congress shall have 
power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 117. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 118. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1250. 
 119. Id. Some authority supports the proposition that cars are per se instrumentalities of 
commerce, regardless of whether the car has crossed state lines. See United States v. Bishop, 66 
F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995). If that was the case, the Garcia court noted that Congress would have 
a plenary power to regulate not only the car rental market, but also many aspects of automobile use. 
Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1250. Because the implications of construing all automobiles as per se 
instrumentalities would be far-reaching, the court decided it would be more prudent to examine the 
Graves Amendment’s constitutionality under the third prong of the Commerce Clause power. Id. 
 120. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1250–51. 
 121.  545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). 
 122. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251–52. 
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protects car rental markets by eliminating state-imposed vicarious liability 
laws that Congress deemed burdensome to the car rental industry.123 
Because the state tort law and resulting lawsuits were a “burden on an 
economic activity with substantial effects on commerce,” the Graves 
Amendment’s effect, through federal preemption, was to deregulate the car 
rental market.124 Since “it has long been understood that the commerce 
power includes not only the ability to regulate interstate markets, but [also] 
the ability to facilitate interstate commerce by removing intrastate burdens 
and obstructions to it,”125 Congress’ method of protecting the entire car 
rental market through deregulation was deemed permissible.126 The court 
held that this “novel”127 method of federal regulation was constitutional, 
stating that “Congress may choose any ‘means reasonably adapted to the 
attainment of the suited end, even though they involved control of 
intrastate activities.’”128  
Garcia  v. Vanguard will not be the last major constitutional challenge 
to the Graves Amendment,129 and the issue could eventually make it to the 
Supreme Court.130 While it remains to be seen how the Florida Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 1252. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1937)). Note that 
the tortfeasor in Garcia never left the state of Florida and the record did not indicate whether he 
intended to do so. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1245.  
 126. Id. at 1253. One should note that the Graves Amendment’s legislative history is devoid of 
any evidence that deregulation or market protection were motives for its passage. See nerally 151 
CONG. REC. H1199-1202 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005). Nor did members of Congress ever discuss 
Congress’ authority to enact the legislation under the Commerce Clause. See id. 
 127. Congress had only once previously enacted a federal statute with the sole purpose and 
effect of preempting “burdensome suits” based on state law. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1252. The 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) preempts certain tort suits against gun 
manufacturers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–03 (2006). This statute has also been widely criticized as an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power. See, e.g., Jenny Miao Jiang, Regulating 
Litigation Under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Economic Activity or Regulatory 
Nullity?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2007). However, as of the date of this Note, the statute has 
withstood constitutional challenges. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 
384 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute). S e generally 17 A.L.R. FED. 2D 
§ 167 (2008) (collecting and analyzing cases that “have determined issues concerning the validity, 
construction or application of the PLCAA”). 
 128. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1253 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)). 
 129. Trial lawyers have predicted that constitutional challenges will continue unless the 
Supreme Court addresses the issue. Se , e.g., Being Prepared, http://seitelman.wordpress.com/2008/ 
09/03/car-rental-agencies-win-one-round/ (Sept. 3, 2008, 20:45 EST). New York is a hotbed of 
judicial activity in this area. See, e.g., Stampolis v. Provident Auto Leasing Co., 586 F.2d 88 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (upholding the constitutionality of the Graves Amendment); Graham v. Dunkley, 
852 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (upholding the constitutionality of the Graves 
Amendment and preempting New York’s vicarious liability statute). 
 130. If federal circuit courts split, or if a state supreme court decision conflicts with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Garcia v. Vanguard, the Supreme Court could grant certiorari. ROBERT 
L. STERN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE: FOR PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
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Court will react to Garcia v. Vanguard,131 the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
is highly persuasive.132 Post-Garcia, Florida’s Fourth District Court of 
Appeal, in Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., was the first Florida appellate 
court to weigh in on the constitutionality of the Graves Amendment.133 
After holding the Graves Amendment unconstitutional only a few months 
prior,134 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed itself, relying heavily 
on the Garcia decision to hold that the Graves Amendment was 
constitutional and preempted Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2.135 By the 
end of 2008, each Florida District Court of Appeal had similarly held that 
the Graves Amendment was constitutional and preempted Florida law.136 
Thus, unless the Florida Supreme Court decides otherwise, the district 
courts of appeal will undoubtedly continue to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s 
holding in Garcia, effectively putting to death Florida’s vicarious liability 
law as applied to short-term lessors.137  
                                                                                                                     
226, 240 (2002). But see infra note 180. 
 131. The Florida Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of great public importance 
certified by Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal in Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 993 So. 
2d 614, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, 
PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(B)2, FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)?”). As of the date of this 
Note, Vargas remains active on the Florida Supreme Court’s docket.  
 132. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that federal laws “shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any[] . . . laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  However, “[s]tate courts . . . are 
not bound by any federal court regarding the interpretation of state law and only by the United 
States Supreme Court in regard to interpretations of the United States Constitution and Acts of 
Congress.” Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers v. Blount Int’l, Ltd., 519 
So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); see also Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) 
(stating that federal courts lack the authority to place a construction on a state statute different from 
the one rendered by a state’s highest court, regardless of whether the state law is procedural or 
substantive); State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976) (stating that although “lower federal 
court rulings may be . . . persuasive, such rulings are not binding on state courts”); Exch. Nat’l 
Bank in Winter Haven v. Sheffield, 166 So. 2d 807, 808, 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (stating that a 
federal appellate decision construing a Florida statutes which has not been construed by Florida 
courts was not conclusive on the district court of appeal but was highly persuasive). 
 133. 993 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (en banc) (holding the Graves Amendment within 
Congress’ commerce powers and the state cap on rental car company vicarious liability not a 
financial responsibility exemption); see supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, No. 4D07-2010, 2008 WL 2663715 (Fla. 4th 
DCA July 9, 2008), corrected and superseded by No. 4D07-2010, 2008 WL 2744335 (Fla. 4th 
DCA July 16, 2008), reh’g granted en banc, withdrawn, 993 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 
 135. Vargas, 933 So. 2d at 623. 
 136. See Vargas, 933 So. 2d at 623–24; Karling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2 So. 3d 354, 
355 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Kumarsingh v. PV Holding Corp., 983 So. 2d 599, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008); Lucas v. Williams, 984 So. 2d 580, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); St. Onge v. White, 988 So. 2d 
59, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Bechina v. Enter. Leasing Co., 972 So. 2d 925, 926–27 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007). 
 137. Although Garcia only explicitly addressed short-term lessors, it is likely that the district 
courts of appeal will apply the Graves Amendment to long-term lessors. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1245–
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D.  Why the Graves Amendment May Not Preempt Florida Law 
Since the Graves Amendment does not define “financial 
responsibility,”138 a court could construe Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 
to fit within the savings clause of the Graves Amendment.139 Florida 
Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 resides in the chapter entitled “Financial 
Responsibility,”140 and the title of a chapter generally reflects legislative 
intent.141 Florida courts have never doubted that Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b) is a financial responsibility law for purposes of Florida 
law.142 Likewise, before the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Garcia, at least 
one Florida court, without addressing whether the Graves Amendment was 
constitutional, ruled that the Graves Amendment did not preempt Florida 
Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2.143  
However, Florida’s opinion of its own law is not the dispositive issue. 
The question remains whether Congress intended for statutes like Florida 
Statutes § 324.021(9)(b) to fall within the Graves Amendment’s savings 
clause. Although the manifest weight of the evidence suggests that the 
Graves Amendment preempts all Florida law,144 the issue is not without 
debate. Historically, an “intention of Congress to exclude states from 
exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.”145 The Court has 
held that a “presumption against the pre-emption of state police power 
regulations . . . . is consistent with both federalism concerns and the 
historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.”146  But 
                                                                                                                     
49; see also supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
 138. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1246. 
 139. See infra note 143 and accompanying text; supra note 131. 
 140. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (2009). 
 141. See, e.g., Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20, 25 (Fla. 2004); 
City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 29–30 n.3 (Fla. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. § 324.011 
(2009) (noting that a purpose of the chapter is to “provide financial security requirements for such 
owners or operators whose responsibility it is to recompense others for injury”). However, 
“distinguishing between pre-empted and non-pre-empted claims based on the particular label 
affixed to them would ‘elevate form over substance . . . .’” Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 
200, 214 (2004). 
 142. See, e.g., Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 837 n.17 (1959) 
(citing Florida Statutes Chapter 324 as a provision to assure financial responsibility of owners); 
Poole v. Enter. Leasing Co., No. 05-2005-CA-008150, 2006 WL 1388442, at *1 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. 
Mar. 9, 2006); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Poole, 2006 WL 1388442, at *1. 
 144. See supra notes 101–15 and accompanying text. Courts must apply valid rules of federal 
law when they contradict state laws under the Supremacy Clause. See U S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
145. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942) 
(quoting Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)). 
146. Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). The 
appropriateness of a presumption against federal preemption has been the subject of much debate. 
See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 62 (arguing that recent Supreme Court cases have shifted 
the presumption in favor of preemption); Scordato, supra note 62, at 29 (criticizing the presumption 
against preemption). 
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the Court has not reliably applied this presumption, leading critics to 
accuse the Court of imposing substantive preferences in preemption 
cases.147 Given the unpredictability inherent in federal preemption analysis, 
a court could broadly construe the Graves Amendment’s savings clause 
and find a clear and manifest intent not to preempt Florida’s financial 
responsibility law.148  
The savings clause in 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) contemplates statutes 
that directly require owners to meet the financial responsibility or 
insurance standards as a precursor to the registration and operation of a 
motor vehicle.149 The Garcia court opined that Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 does not qualify as a financial responsibility law under 49 
U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) because it merely induces, but does not directly 
require, car rental companies to ensure that their lessees are fully 
insured.150 To date, this first subsection has been the primary focus of 
Graves Amendment jurisprudence.151 However, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) 
may be broader in effect and thus warrants separate analysis.152  
The Graves Amendment will not preempt any state law “imposing 
liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or 
leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or 
liability insurance requirements under State law.”153 This provision does 
not refer to any single part of a state’s financial responsibility laws or 
minimum insurance requirements; rather, by referring to state laws 
generically, Congress could have been referring to the entire class of 
laws.154 Hence, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) may apply to any state law within 
                                                                                                                     
 147. New Evidence, supra note 62, at 1604. “Modern preemption jurisprudence is a muddle” 
and preemption issues uniquely cut across ideological lines in non-traditional ways, often leading to 
strange bedfellows in this area. Scordato, supra note 62, at 3–4, 8. 
 148. Before the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Garcia, a Florida appellate court reached this 
conclusion. Brookins v. Ford Credit Titling Trust, No. 4D07-2010, 2008 WL 2663715 (Fla. 4th 
DCA July 9, 2008), corrected and superseded by No. 4D07-2010, 2008 WL 2744335 (Fla. 4th 
DCA Jul. 16, 2008), reh’g granted en banc, withdrawn, 993 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).  
 149. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2006). 
 150. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1248. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(7)’s minimum insurance requirements for all vehicle owners, would qualify as a financial 
responsibility law as contemplated by the Graves Amendment. S e id. at 1247. 
 151. The Garcia court reasoned that Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 could not qualify as a 
financial responsibility law pursuant to the Graves Amendment’s savings clause because in so doing 
the exception would swallow the rule. Id at 1248. 
 152. Ironically, by completely neglecting to address the Florida statutes under the second 
subsection of the savings clause, the Garcia court interpreted § 30106(b)(1) to swallow 49 U.S.C. 
§ 30106(b)(2). Vargas, 993 So. 2d at 625–26 (Farmer, J., dissenting); see also Garcia, 540 F.3d at 
1247 (noting that “[b]oth provisions of the savings clause strongly imply that financial 
responsibility is closely linked to insurance requirements.”). 
 153. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 154. Vargas, 993 So. 2d at 626 (Farmer, J., dissenting). Judge Farmer suggested that Congress 
“intentionally and purposefully omitted any special definition of financial responsibility laws of its 
own because this term is widely used and understood to refer to an entire class of laws.” Id.; see 
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the universe of financial responsibility and minimum insurance laws, 
including Florida’s short-term and long-term lease statutes.155  
Additionally, unlike 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1), there is nothing in 
§ 30106(b)(2) that specifies whether the statute must directly impose 
liability for a failure to meet financial responsibility or insurance 
requirements.156 Courts have previously interpreted Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 as “simply a cap on strict vicarious liability damages and 
nothing more.”157 But an alternative interpretation characterizes Florida 
Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 as follows: 
Section 324.021(9)(b) fixes financial responsibility through a 
liability insurance requirement. . . . [and] fixes minimum 
insurance requirements as the basis for eliminating vicarious 
responsibility of the [lessors]. They force the [lessor] to place 
these minimum insurance requirements in every lease or 
rental contract. If the [lessee] should fail to comply with the 
contract and have such insurance in effect, then the [lessor] 
must itself have back-up coverage or face liability for the fault 
of the operator of the vehicle. Essentially, the [lessor’s] only 
duty under this statute is to see that insurance is actually in 
effect at all times.158  
Thus, § 324.021(9)(b)2 may actually eliminate lessors’ vicarious 
liability; lessors only have a duty to secure the placement of the minimum 
insurance amounts as specified in the statute and failure to do so may result 
in liability for up to $500,000 in economic damages.159 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                     
also id. at 626–27 n.16 (listing numerous federal statutes that use the term “financial responsibility” 
and noting that in “every other instance Congress has used the term to refer not to a single statute or 
particular provision within a statute but only in a general sense to refer to a whole class”). 
 155. Id. at 626. 
 156. Id. Section 30106(b)(2) clearly indicates that lessors are not relieved from all state-
imposed insurance responsibilities. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2). 
 157. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 158. Vargas, 993 So. 2d at 633 (Farmer, J., dissenting). The Vargas dissent questioned 
whether the Graves Amendment actually conflicted with § 324.021(9)(b)2: “How does a State law 
ending the vicarious liability of [lessors] when they provide security for financial responsibility 
through minimum insurance requirements have any conflict with a federal law not affecting 
financial responsibility insurance obligations imposed under State law and which preempts only the 
vicarious liability of [lessors]?” Id. at 625. 
 159. Id. at 633; see also FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009). When the lessor fails to ensure 
that the lessee has an appropriate amount of insurance coverage, the lessor has violated the 
minimum insurance requirements. Vargas, 993 So. 2d at 633 (Farmer, J., dissenting). Although the 
extent of the lessor’s additional liability is contingent upon the injured victim’s economic damages, 
liability is not vicarious; the additional liability penalizes the lessor for its failure to meet the 
minimum insurance requirements, compensating the victim for the lessor’s wrongful conduct and 
deterring the lessor from engaging in future misconduct. See FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (2009).  
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss3/6
2010] THE GRAVES AMENDMENT 817 
 
49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) arguably exempts state laws like Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 that indirectly impose liability on a motor vehicle owner 
for failure to meet its financial responsibility or liability insurance 
requirements.160  
If after employing various canons of construction a court still found 
ambiguity in the language of the Graves Amendment’s savings clause, a 
court could consult the legislative history to elucidate congressional 
intent.161 It is clear from the discussion on the House floor that the Graves 
Amendment was specifically aimed at state statutes that permitted an 
unlimited amount of vicarious liability damages to be imposed against car 
rental companies.162 However, Congress arguably did not intend for the 
Graves Amendment to eliminate statutory schemes, like Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2, which limits the amount of vicarious liability 
damages.163 
E.  Why the Graves Amendment May Be Held Unconstitutional 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to analyze the Graves Amendment 
under the aggregation doctrine was outcome-determinative.164 Pursuant to 
Gonzales v. Raich’s165 aggregation analysis, “Congress need only have a 
rational basis for concluding that the regulated activities, in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”166 However, as the Eleventh 
Circuit noted, the Supreme Court has made clear that aggregation analysis 
is not appropriate in every context.167 The fate of the Graves Amendment 
could be markedly different if a court chooses to interpret the Graves 
                                                                                                                     
 160. The counterargument is that Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b)2 merely caps, and does not 
impose, liability on lessors (indirectly or otherwise). Vargas, 993 So. 2d at 621 (majority opinion). 
Further, the provision that creates potential liability for an additional $500,000 when the lessee fails 
to secure adequate insurance is arguably “a contingency provision, effectively creating a cost-
benefit risk analysis for motor vehicle lessors.” Garcia, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 831. 
 161. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 162. See 151 CONG. REC. H1201 (2005) (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher); 
id. at 1202 (Statement of Rep. Graves). 
 163.  See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009). 
 164. See Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251–52. 
 165.  541 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 166. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251 (citing Raich, 541 U.S. at 22). In Raich, which is the most 
recent seminal Supreme Court case in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a federal statute regulating intrastate manufacture and possession of medicinal 
marijuana. Raich, 541 U.S. at 9; J. Richard Broughton, The Second Death of Capital Punishment, 
58 FLA. L. REV. 639, 661 (2006); see also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
of 1970, §§ 401(a)(1), 404(a), 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2006).  
 167. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) 
(noting that the criminal statute at issue was not an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme and 
hence not subject to aggregation analysis); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000) 
(noting that Congress may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the 
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce). 
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Amendment pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ”significant considerations” 
analysis in United States v. Morrison168 or United States v. Lopez.169  
In 1995, for the first time in nearly six decades, the Lopez Court struck 
down a federal statute on the grounds that Congress unconstitutionally 
exceeded its Commerce Clause power.170 At issue was the constitutionality 
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,171 which made it a federal 
offense for an individual to knowingly possess a firearm within one 
thousand feet of a school.172 In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that the 
presence of a gun in a school zone did not have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, thus holding the statute unconstitutional.173 
Five years later, the Court’s decision in Morrison demonstrated that 
Lopez was not an aberration, signaling that the Court would scrupulously 
monitor federal laws that attempted to regulate intrastate activities.174 The 
Morrison Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act175 that permitted a private civil remedy to victims of gender-
based violence, even when no criminal charges were filed.176 The Court 
                                                                                                                     
 168. 529 U.S. 598, 609–17 (2000). 
 169. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Morrison and Lopez 
Courts’ “significant considerations” analysis is less deferential than the “aggregation analysis” 
under Raich. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251. Earlier federal district court rulings highlight the outcome-
determinative nature of the choice of what test to apply. Compare Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. 
v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1349–51 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding the Graves Amendment 
unconstitutional after taking into account Morrison’s and Lopez’s “significant considerations” test) 
and Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1380–82 (S.D. Fla. 2007) 
(holding the Graves Amendment unconstitutional under the Lopez and Morrison “significant 
consideration” four-factor test), with Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 
821, 836–37 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding the Graves Amendment constitutional under the Raich 
“aggregation analysis” and rejecting the Morrison four-factor test). 
 170. A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 
101, 138 (2007). From 1937 to 1995, the Court took an expansive view of the federal Commerce 
Clause power, causing a proliferation of federal regulation of conduct and transactions. Cary B. 
Davis, Comment, The Commerce Clause: Border Crossing + Church Burning = Interstate 
Commerce (A Formula for Federalizing Common Law State Crimes), 57 FLA. L. REV. 975, 976 
(2005). 
 171. Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q), 924(a) (2006)). 
 172. Erwin Chemerinsky, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law: The Values of Federalism, 
47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 518 (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. 1993); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 173. Id. at 520 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
 174. Kevin M. Shuler, Note, Is The Endangered Species Act Endangered in the Age of Strict 
Federalism? A Florida Perspective on the Recent Commerce Clause Challenges to the ESA, 57
FLA. L. REV. 1135, 1144 (2005). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006). 
 176. Morrison, similar to Lopez, was a 5 to 4 decision. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600–02. The 
Court also decided that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the statute under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 627; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV, 
§ 5 (granting Congress power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting 
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stated that Congress could not “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce.”177 Similar to Lopez, the Morrison Court analyzed the federal 
statute under the “substantial relation” prong of the commerce clause 
test.178 In evaluating a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a federal 
statute, the Court proffered a four-factor test to determine whether the 
regulated activity “substantially affected” interstate commerce: 
1) Whether Congress made findings about the activity’s 
impact on interstate commerce, 
2) Whether the federal statute contains an “express 
jurisdictional element” limiting the statute’s reach, 
3) Whether the activity is commercial or economic by nature, 
[and] 
4) Whether the connection between the activity and its effect 
on interstate commerce is attenuated. 179 
If a court analyzed the Graves Amendment under this four-prong test, it 
is significantly less likely that the Amendment would pass muster.180 
Foremost, it is uncontroverted that Congress did not make findings about 
the impact of vicarious liability claims on the interstate car rental and 
leasing industries,181 nor did Congress include express jurisdictional 
elements that limited the Graves Amendment’s reach.182 The statute is 
                                                                                                                     
appropriate legislation).  
 177. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. 
 178. Id. at 608–09; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 179. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2007) 
(citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–12); Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d 
1371, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–12). 
 180. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Thus far, the Supreme Court has refused to 
enter the Graves Amendment debate. S e, e.g., Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 
1242 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1369 (2009). 
 181. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. During debate on the 
House floor, Representative Graves repeatedly stated that vicarious liability claims cost consumers 
more than $100 million annually, but it is unclear how this figure was determined. 151 CONG. REC. 
H1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005). There were no hearings. 151 CONG. REC. H1201 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 
2005) (Statement of Rep. Conyers). Moreover, no members of Congress even suggested that 
regulated state-imposed liability claims substantially affected the motor vehicle leasing or rental 
industry. 151 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed. May 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. Santorum); see also 
151 CONG. REC. H1199-1202 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (House Debate on Graves Amendment). 
 182. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. The immunity 
protections within the statute clearly apply to wholly intrastate practices. The Graves Amendment 
applies to motor vehicle owners that are “engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing 
motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (2006). Consider a scenario in which a Florida company 
rents mopeds on Key West and does not permit lessors to travel off of the island. Assuming motor 
vehicles are not per se instrumentalities of commerce, the rental company is engaged in a wholly 
intrastate activity. However, the Graves Amendment would shield that company from vicarious 
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arguably economic in nature, as rental and leasing companies may pass the 
expense of satisfying vicarious liability judgments to its customers.183  
But the strength of the connection between the regulated activity and its 
effect on interstate commerce is attenuated.184 Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 effectively imposes civil liability on short-term lessors 
for their lessees’ negligence.185 Car rental companies may choose to 
respond to that potential liability by passing the potential costs on to their 
customers, which could affect interstate commerce.186 It is debatable 
whether the piling of inferences in this manner is sufficient to justify the 
regulation. Further, it is unlikely that a single judgment imposing vicarious 
liability on a car rental company would affect the industry as a whole,187 as 
there are an estimated 1.813 million vehicles in service188 and market 
industry revenues approximate $21.88 billion.189 Even if the estimated cost 
                                                                                                                     
liability claims. The Eleventh Circuit compared the Graves Amendment to the PLCAA, a statute 
that also eliminated state-based tort claims. See supra note 127. But unlike the Graves Amendment, 
a jurisdictional nexus is included with each subsection of the PLCAA, clearly defining which sellers 
are given qualified immunity. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(6) (2006). 
 183. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. However, the Court 
held in Lopez that a criminal statute has nothing to do with “‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. The question 
remains whether civil liability for harm, the activity regulated by the Graves Amendment, is 
economic in nature. See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text. 
 184. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1380; see also NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (stating that Congressional power to regulate 
commerce “may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and 
remote that . . . would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is 
local and create a completely centralized government”). 
 185. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009); see also supra Part III.B. 
 186. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.  
 187. In spite of the Graves Amendment’s shielding of car rental companies, rental costs have 
spiraled upward in recent years due to higher vehicle costs. Carol Wolf, Car Rental Costs Spiral 
Upward, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2007, at D4. In 2009 alone, “the average weekly rate for a 
compact car rental at an airport jumped 51 percent from 2008 levels, to $335.05,” while fleet sizes 
and demand have decreased. Report: Rental Car Rates Jumped 51 percent in 2009, PHOENIX BUS. 
J., Jan. 11, 2010, available at http://phoenix.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2010/01/11/daily3 
.html. Furthermore, rising gas prices have plagued car rental companies; car rental companies have 
been slow to respond to consumers’ demand for fuel-efficient rental vehicles and thus have limited 
supply. Ken Bensinger, A 16-mpg Rental Car: That’s an Upgrade?, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2008, at 
A1.  
 188. 2008 U.S. CAR RENTAL MARKET, AUTO RENTAL NEWS (2008), available at 
http://www.autorentalnews.com/t_pop_pdf.cfm?action=stat&link=http://www.fleet-central.com/ 
resources/ARNFB09UScarrentalMarket.pdf. 
 189. 2008 RENTAL REVENUE, AUTO RENTAL NEWS (2008), available at 
http://www.autorentalnews.com/t_pop_pdf.cfm?action=stat&link=http://www.fleet-central.com/ 
resources/ARNFB09UScarrentalRevenue.pdf. Despite a reduction in the total number of rented 
vehicles from 2007 to 2008, industry revenues increased by approximately $390 million during that 
period. Id. Over the past decade, the auto rental industry has increased its revenues by 
approximately $10 billion. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPARATIVE STATISTICS: 2002, at 20 (2006), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0200ccomp.pdf (showing that the 2002 annual 
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of $100 million annually from vicarious liability judgments was accurate, 
as advanced by Representative Graves,190 that figure accounts for less than 
0.5% of the car rental industry’s total revenue.191 One questions how 
“substantially” the now preempted state vicarious liability laws affected 
interstate commerce. 
Because a court would likely hold the Graves Amendment 
unconstitutional under the Morrison four-factor test, the dispositive 
question is whether it is appropriate to use Raich’s aggregation analysis.192 
Lopez and Morrison dictated that aggregation analysis is only appropriate 
if the regulated activity is truly economic in nature.193 Likewise, the 
Eleventh Circuit has stated that “the comprehensiveness of the economic 
component of the regulation” is what distinguishes Raich from Morrison 
and Lopez.194 The Garcia court had no difficulty concluding that “the 
commercial leasing of cars is, in the aggregate, an economic activity with 
substantial effects on interstate commerce.”195 It stated that the commercial 
leasing of cars substantially affected interstate commerce in the aggregate 
because: (1) the industry is large in size; (2) the industry is national in 
scope; and (3) rented vehicles are often used as instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce.196  
This conclusory analysis is unconvincing. While the effects of the 
Graves Amendment itself could affect interstate commerce, that is not the 
proper inquiry. Courts must determine whether the activity being regulated 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.197 The Graves Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
revenue for passenger car rental was approximately $18.6 billion and that the 1997 annual revenue 
for passenger car rental was approximately $14.8 billion). 
 190. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 191. Although the $100 million in costs would decrease the rental companies’ profits, as 
opposed to revenues, the rental companies undoubtedly pass that projected cost onto consumers.  
 192. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit has previously noted 
that “potential confusion . . . may arise from the now unclear status of the four Morrison/Lopez 
factors post-Raich.” United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1216 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 193. Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival 
After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (2005); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of 
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases 
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic 
in nature.”). 
 194. Maxwell, 446 F.3d at 1214. The Raich Court went to great lengths to distinguish, rather 
than overrule, Lopez and Morrison. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (noting that unlike the 
statutes in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the statute in Raich were 
“quintessentially economic”). 
 195. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008)
However, the Graves Amendment does not directly regulate the commercial leasing of cars. See 
infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 196. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1252.  
 197. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (holding that the regulated activities were non-economic 
and thus not a part of “commerce,” even though the activity had economic effects); United States v. 
27
Steinberg: The Graves Amendment: Putting to Death Florida's Strict Vicarious
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
822 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
does not directly regulate the auto rental market or its vehicles; it limits the 
civil liability of lessors for the negligence of their lessees.198 Arguably, 
vicarious liability claims are not “economic” even under the expansive 
definition supplied by Raich.199 Accident victims do not seek damages in 
furtherance of any cognizable market, and an award of damages cannot be 
reasonably classified as a commodity.200 Moreover, injured parties do not 
acquire actual wealth from their vicarious liability claims; they seek 
recompense for what was lost in the accident.201 Thus, because a court 
                                                                                                                     
Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[A]sk[ing] whether the challenged regulation substantially affects 
interstate commerce, rather than whether the activity being regulated does so . . . seems inconsistent 
with the  Supreme Court’s holdings in United States v. Lopez . . . and United States v. Morrison.”). 
Of course this inquiry would be much easier had Congress made any findings on the effect of state-
based vicarious liability claims on the interstate car rental industry as a whole. See supra note 181 
and accompanying text. 
198. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2006). There is no evidence that Congress intended for the 
Graves Amendment to remove burdens from interstate commerce, nor did Congress even discuss 
whether such claims substantially affected the interstate auto rental industry. 151 CONG. REC. 
S5433-34 (daily ed. May 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. Santorum); 151 CONG. REC. H1199-1202 
(daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (House Debate on Graves Amendment). However, the Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned that the distinction between a regulation of state tort law and the regulation of the car 
rental market was irrelevant. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1252. The effect of the statute was to deregulate 
the car rental market, and “it has long been understood that the commerce power includes not only 
the ability to regulate interstate markets, but the ability to facilitate interstate commerce by 
removing intrastate burdens and obstructions to it.” Id. But under Garcia’s rationale, Congress 
could preempt any state statute that has the potential to raise the cost of doing business within a 
particular state. See Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1350 (S.D. 
Fla. 2007).  
199. Raich defines economics as “the production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
720 (1966)). The Court noted that the prohibition of the medicinal marijuana was proper because 
“there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 26. Additionally, Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines commerce as “[t]he exchange of goods and services” or “[t]rade and other 
business activities.” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (9th ed. 2009). If the Court construed the 
imposition of tort liability as “economic” or commercial, it would require a broader definition than 
the one supplied in Raich or Black’s Law Dictionary.  However, critics have argued that because 
almost any human activity could be construed to involve “distribution” or “consumption” of a 
commodity, a court could classify virtually any non-economic activity as economic. Ilya Somin, A 
False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules after Gonzales v. Raich, 2005–06 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 113, 118 (2006); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“the Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach”). 
 200. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a commodity as “[a]n article of trade or commerce,” 
which “embraces only tangible goods, such as products or merchandise, as distinguished from 
services.” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (9th ed. 2009). 
 201. See Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257 (1924) (“Compensation is a fundamental 
principle of damages whether the action is in contract or in tort.”); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 
2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965) (stating that “the primary basis for an award of damages is 
compensation . . .  to make the injured party whole to the extent that it is possible.”); Hanna v. 
Martin, 49 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1950) (stating that “[t]he fundamental principle of the law of 
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could determine that the regulated activity should not be classified as 
“economic” under Raich, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to employ 
Raich’s aggregation doctrine rather than Morrison’s substantial factor 
analysis was questionable.202 
The Raich opinion also reaffirmed that regulation of “noneconomic” 
activity is permissible if the regulated “class of activities” is an “essential 
part of the larger regulatory scheme.”203 However, the Graves Amendment 
is not a part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.204 Like the challenged 
statutes in Lopez and Morrison, it is a brief, single subject statute “with no 
statutory element requiring proof that particular instances of vicarious 
liability ‘have any connection to past interstate activity or a predictable 
impact on future commercial activity.’”205 Concluding that the regulated 
activity was economic in nature, the court dismissed this argument without 
sufficiently addressing its merits.206  
If a court, similar to Garcia, did decide to employ the Raich 
aggregation analysis, it would need to determine whether Congress had a 
rational basis for enacting the Graves Amendment.207 Admittedly the 
rational basis test is a very low hurdle to overcome,208 but in the absence of 
any congressional findings209 or a comprehensive legislative scheme, a 
court could conclude that the Graves Amendment fails this lowest level of 
                                                                                                                     
damages is that the person injured . . . by wrongful or negligent act . . . shall have fair and just 
compensation commensurate with the loss sustained.”). 
 202. See Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251–52; supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 203. Raich, 545 U.S. at 26–27. “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not 
itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that 
class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” Id. at 18. 
See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (creating and applying aggregate effects 
doctrine). Critics question whether the Raich Court eliminated Lopez’s requirement that the 
regulated activity be an “essential” part of the regulatory scheme. Somin, supra note 199, at 119; 
see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Court appears to equate 
‘essential’ with ‘necessary’”). If that is the case, the regulation of virtually any activity could be 
claimed to be a part of a broader regulatory scheme. Somin, supra note 199, at 119.  
 204. Garcia, 540 F.3d at 1251–52. 
 205. Id. at 1251 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 23). 
 206. Id. at 1251–52. 
 207. See Somin, supra note 199, at 119. Although Raich allows Congress to regulate purely 
intrastate activity if failure to do so would undercut the regulation of the interstate market, no 
member of Congress mentioned the regulation of the interstate car rental market during 
congressional debate. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 18; supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 208. Critics opine that the rational basis standard eliminates any technical inquiry into whether 
intrastate activities substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, and reliance on this test has 
historically led to judicial inaction. David M. Crowell, Note, Gonzales v. Raich and the 
Development of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Is the Necessary and Proper Clause the Perfect 
Drug?, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 251, 307 (2006). 
 209. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. It is difficult to conclude anything about 
Congress’ intent, other than that it sought to establish a fair national standard for liability. 151 
CONG. REC. H1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Graves). 
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scrutiny.210 Even if Congress had made any findings, its relevance would 
depend heavily on the breadth of the “class of activities” being 
regulated.211 Judicial interpretation of congressional findings is an arbitrary 
process under Raich, especially considering the reasonableness of 
Morrison’s stricter four-part test.212  
IV.   PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
Florida’s current approach to compensating individuals injured by car 
rental drivers is unacceptable.213 Consider the following scenario: A 25-
year-old stockbroker is paralyzed after his car was struck by a negligent, 
uninsured, indigent driver of a rented vehicle in Florida.214 Before the 
Graves Amendment, in this example, the car rental company would likely 
be liable for $100,000 for the stockbroker’s bodily injuries, up to $50,000 
in property damage, and an additional $500,000 in other economic 
damages.215 However, after federal preemption of Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2, the paralyzed man would likely recover from the car 
rental company’s insurer a mere $10,000 for his bodily injuries and up to 
$10,000 for property damage to his vehicle.216 Because short-term lessors 
are less likely to have automobile insurance than other Florida drivers, it is 
                                                                                                                     
 210. See, e.g., Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Drouin, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1350 (S.D. 
Fla. 2007); Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. v. Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 
2007) (noting that although there was a possible economic impact of increased costs on some small 
businesses, “there is no rational basis to support a conclusion that vicarious tort liability for car 
rental or leasing companies substantially affects interstate commerce”). 
 211. Crowell, supra note 208, at 308. Clearly, if a court classifies the Graves Amendment as 
regulating state tort judgments, rather than the national car rental industry, it is more likely to hold 
that Congress unconstitutionally exceeded its powers granted by the Commerce Clause. 
 212. Crowell, supra note 208, at 308 (“Reasonable minds can differ as to what the class of 
activities will be, just as reasonable minds can differ over whether an activity is economic or 
noneconomic, or whether an intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce.”). 
 213. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. Perplexingly, an automobile owner 
remains vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of the owner’s vehicle by a 
permissive user. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)3 (2009). Then again, individual automobile owners 
do not have the benefit of Washington lobbyists. 
 214. This scenario is unchanged if the car rental driver is a foreign motorist who leaves the 
country after the accident. Note that the Graves Amendment did not require uninsured drivers to 
purchase insurance as a prerequisite to renting a car. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 215. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009). This situation is similar to the case of Ethan 
Ruby, who recovered approximately $20 million in New York. See supra notes 1–5 and 
accompanying text. 
 216. See FLA. STAT. §§ 324.021(7),.051(2)(a) (2009) (mandating a minimum of 10/20/10 
insurance coverage or else the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles will suspend “the 
license of each operator and all registrations of the owner of the vehicles operated by such operator” 
after an accident); Kumarsingh v. PV Holding Corp., 983 So. 2d 599, 600–01 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) 
(recognizing that the statutory minimum financial responsibility requirement of Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(7) still applied after the codification of the Graves Amendment). Of course, the injured 
stockbroker would likely be compensated by his own automobile insurance. 
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more likely that the negligent car rental driver will not have adequate funds 
to compensate the paralyzed stockbroker.217  
The Florida Legislature must take legislative action to avoid this 
undesirable result.218 Foremost, the legislature should consider increasing 
the minimum requirements for proof of financial responsibility for all 
motor vehicles.219 As of 2002, Florida had the second highest car rental 
revenue by state,220 with California having the highest revenue and Texas 
having the third highest revenue by state.221 But California and Texas 
require that all owners carry minimum coverage of 15/30/5222 and 
25/50/25,223 respectively. Florida’s financial responsibility laws are 
outdated and the minimum requirements need to be increased to meet 
current market demands. However, any suggestion to increase these 
minimum requirements would be controversial.224 Even if the Florida 
Legislature raised the minimums of § 324.021(7), the revised statutory 
scheme would provide far less protection for individuals injured by drivers 
of rental vehicles than pre-Graves Amendment.225 
In 2009, a bill in the Florida Senate proposed another solution, 
recommending a simple clarification of the language of Florida Statutes 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Pursuant to Florida Statutes §§ 324.022, 627.7275,.736, all Florida drivers must obtain 
and maintain $10,000 of personal injury protection and $10,000 property damage coverage. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Florida Statutes §§ 324.021(7), .051(2)(a), a Florida driver will forfeit his 
or her license and registration if at the time of an accident his or her liability insurance coverage 
does not meet the minimum limits of bodily injury liability of $10,000 per person; $20,000 per 
crash; and $10,000 property damage liability per crash. See Vargas v. Enter. Leasing Co., 993 So. 
2d 614, 620 n.5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). However, car rental drivers, including those who live out of 
the United States, do not have to meet any minimum insurance requirements. Se  supra note 53 and 
accompanying text. It is perplexing why the Florida Legislature requires up to $20,000 of bodily 
injury liability for proof of financial responsibility but does not require it otherwise. Se  FLA. STAT. 
§§ 324.022, 627.7275, .736 (2009). 
 218. Opponents of the Graves Amendment have suggested that taxpayers could bear the 
ultimate burden of supporting individuals injured by drivers of rented vehicles. Se  upra note 53. 
 219. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(7)(a)-(c) (2009). During the 2008 legislative session, two bills 
called for an incremental increase of the minimum requirements for proof of financial 
responsibility, over a four-year period, to 25/50/25 coverage. Se  H.R. 729, 110th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2008); S. 2258, 110th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008). Not surprisingly, both proposals were short 
lived. See Selected Bill Detail; HB 729—Motor Vehicle Insurance, FLORIDA HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=38145& 
SessionId=57 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); Bill Info; SB 2258: Relating to Motor Vehicle Liability 
Insurance [EPCC], THE FLORIDA SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mode=Bi 
lls&SubMenu=1&BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&BillNum=2258 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 220. The rental revenue was estimated at $2.265 billion, or 12.16%, of the nation’s overall 
revenue. Industry Statistics Sampler; NAICS 532111; Passenger Car Rental, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/econ/census02/data/industry/E532111.HTM (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 221. Id.  
 222. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16056 (West 2010). 
 223. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 601.072 (Vernon 2009). 
 224. See supra note 219. 
 225. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)2 (2009). 
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§ 324.021(9)(b)2 to clearly state that short-term lessors “shall be 
financially responsible” for its lessee’s negligence.226 This senate bill 
attempted to avoid preemption by clarifying that Florida intended the short-
term lessor statute to fall within the first subsection of the Graves 
Amendment’s savings clause.227 One questions whether this remedy would 
survive the Garcia court’s preemption analysis.228  
Another potential solution is to require car rental companies to maintain 
a specified amount of liability coverage in excess of the minimum 
requirements set forth in the financial responsibility statute for 
noncommercial motor vehicles.229 For instance, the legislature could 
require car rental companies to provide insurance coverage for all rental 
vehicles of up to (1) $100,000 per person for bodily injury; (2) $300,000 
per incident for bodily injury; and (3) $50,000 for property damage.230 
Because such a law would impose a mandatory minimum as a precursor to 
the registration and operation of the motor vehicle,231 the statutory scheme 
would qualify as a “financial responsibility law” in the savings clause of 
the Graves Amendment,232 as defined by the Eleventh Circuit in Garcia.233 
However, the car rental industry would undoubtedly mobilize against such 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Comm. Substitute for Comm. Substitute for S. 422, 111th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009). 
This bill died in the Committee on Finance and Tax. Bill Info; SB 0422; Relating to Transportation 
[CPSC], THE FLORIDA SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mode=Bills&SubM 
enu=1&Tab=session&BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&BillNum=0422&Chamber=Senate&Year=2009 
&Title=%2D%3EBill%2520Info%3AS%25200422%2D%3ESession%25202009 (last visited Feb. 
27, 2010). 
 227. Comm. Substitute for Comm. Substitute for S. 422, 111th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); 
see also 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2006). 
 228. See supra notes 97–112 and accompanying text. It seems unnecessarily risky to amend the 
statute in this manner. In particular, supporters of the Graves Amendment would argue that the 
imposition of liability is not tied to the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle. 
However, by making the insurance coverage “mandatory,” the amended statute would arguably fit 
within § 30106(b)(2). See Vargas v. Enter. Leasing Co., 933 So. 2d 614, 621–22 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2008). 
 229. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(7)(a)-(c) (2009). The legislature has similarly required owners 
of commercial vehicles and nonpublic-sector buses to maintain specified amounts of liability 
coverage, as specified in Florida Statutes §§ 627.7415 and 627.742, respectively. See FLA STAT. 
§ 324.021(7)(d) (2009). 
 230. This could be achieved by amending Florida Statutes § 324.021(7)(d) as follows: “With 
respect to commercial motor vehicles, nonpublic sector buses, and vehicles that are rented or 
leased for a period of less than [one] year, in the amounts specified in [Sections] 627.7415, 
627.742, and 627.74XX, respectively.” Florida Statutes § 627.74XX could then largely mirror the 
language of Florida Statutes § 627.742, providing the 100/300/50 coverage requirements.  
 231. Failure to comply with the mandatory minimums in the financial responsibility statute 
may result in suspension of “the license of each operator and all registrations of the owner of the 
vehicles operated by such operator whether or not involved in such crash and, in the case of a 
nonresident owner or operator, shall suspend such nonresident’s operating privilege in this state.” 
FLA. STAT. § 324.051(2)(a) (2009). 
 232. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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a bill, exerting tremendous influence in the Florida Legislature through 
campaign donations and lobbying.234 Even if this bill was enacted, the car 
rental companies would undoubtedly pass the costs of additional insurance 
onto all their consumers, thereby defeating a stated purpose of the Graves 
Amendment.235 
Thus, the most viable solution is to require short-term lessees to obtain 
liability insurance with limits of 100/300/50 or $500,000 for combined 
bodily injury liability and property damage liability. This was the approach 
advocated by two identical 2009 bills in the Florida House of 
Representatives and Florida Senate.236 These bills prohibited car rental 
companies from renting to any lessee who failed to maintain the minimum 
levels of insurance.237 This scheme would also permit any properly 
licensed238 rental company to “offer and sell primary motor vehicle liability 
insurance” meeting the 100/300/50 or $500,000 combined coverage 
minimums “together with and incidental to the agreement to rent or lease 
the motor vehicle” at a fee “not to exceed [thirty-five] percent of the 
premium for each policy sold.”239 The bills also immunized car rental 
companies “from claims based solely upon the dangerous instrumentality 
doctrine for the use, operation, or ownership of the insured motor 
vehicle.”240 Although this proposed solution would ultimately drive up 
rental costs for underinsured lessees,241 it would achieve the important 
policy goal of providing sufficient compensation for tort victims.242 
Furthermore, the car rental industry may actually support this proposal 
because of the potential revenue increase from sales of motor vehicle 
liability insurance policies and the guarantee of immunity from vicarious 
                                                                                                                     
 234. During the 2008 election cycle, car and truck rental agencies donated a total of $109,100 
to all candidates running for election in the Florida Legislature. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN 
STATE POLITICS (NIMSP), NATIONAL OVERVIEW MAP, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/  
nationalview.phtml?l=0&f=0&y=2008&abbr=1&b[]=T2500 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). This total 
was fourth highest of all states. See id. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., the defendant in the Garcia 
cases, also employed three Florida lobbyists in 2006 and 2007 and one Florida lobbyist in 2008. 




0&CurrentType=Lobbyist%20Clients (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); see also supra note 92. 
 235. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 236. H.R. 1289, 111th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009); S. 2622, 111th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
2009). 
 237. Fla. H.R. 1289; Fla. S. 2622. 
 238. For information on licenses, see Florida Statutes § 626.321(1)(d) (2009). 
 239. Fla. H.R. 1289; Fla. S. 2622. 
 240. Fla. H.R. 1289; Fla. S. 2622. 
 241. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text. 
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liability claims.243 Although imperfect, this proposed solution 
pragmatically balances the policy interests at stake. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Graves Amendment infringes upon the principles of federalism and 
unconstitutionally commandeers state police powers under the false 
pretense of interstate commerce regulation. The resulting abrogation of 
Florida’s unique dangerous instrumentality doctrine and preemption of 
Florida Statutes § 324.021(9)(b) have left a gaping void in Florida tort law. 
Although the policy reasons behind the dangerous instrumentality and 
vicarious liability doctrines are just as compelling post-Graves 
Amendment,244 the Florida Legislature has not yet remedied this situation. 
Thus, it is imperative that the legislature re-examine Florida Statutes 
§ 324.021(9)(b)2 to ensure victims of negligent car rental drivers are 
adequately compensated for their losses and do not become burdens upon 
the state. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 243. However, Florida H.R. 1289 died in the Insurance, Business & Financial Affairs Policy 
Committee and S. 2622 died in the Committee on Commerce. See Selected Bill Detail; HB 1289–
Motor Vehicle Short-Term Rental or Lease Insurance, FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, May 
2, 2008, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=41616&SessionId 
=61; Bill Info; SB 2258: Relating to Motor Vehicle Short-term Rental or Lease Insurance [CPSC], 
THE FLORIDA SENATE, May 5, 2008, http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mode=Bills& 
SubMenu=1&Tab=session&BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&BillNum=2622&Chamber=Senate&Year= 
2009&Title=%2D%3EBill%2520Info%3AS%25202622%2D%3ESession%25202009. 
 244. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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